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I. INTRODUCTION
Lamona Adams was a member of the Kaiser Foundation Health
Plan of Georgia, a Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") that con-
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tracted to provide comprehensive medical care for Ms. Adams and her
family. Ms. Adams brought her six-month-old son, James, to the Kaiser
facility where he was briefly examined by a Kaiser physician and diag-
nosed with an upper respiratory infection and post nasal drip. The doc-
tor told Ms. Adams to use a vaporizer, and to administer saline nose
drops and Tylenol. She followed the doctor's instructions but awoke at
3:50 a.m. to find her baby even more feverish.
Ms. Adams called the Kaiser emergency number and advised the
Kaiser nurse who answered that the baby's temperature was 104
degrees, that he was having breathing difficulty, and that he was moan-
ing and limp. The Kaiser employee called the on-call physician and
incorrectly advised him that she had already ruled out respiratory dis-
tress. Based upon that erroneous information, the doctor directed that
the child be taken to a hospital 42 miles away! This hospital was under
a multi-million dollar contract with Kaiser that would provide the cheap-
est service for Kaiser, but it was not the closest hospital to Ms. Adams'
son.
En route to this distant hospital, the baby lost consciousness and
experienced respiratory and cardiac arrest. The child's father immedi-
ately changed course and sped to the nearest hospital where the emer-
gency room physician noted that the child was unresponsive. The
doctors began emergency resuscitation measures and were finally able to
obtain a pulse although the baby's breathing was labored. Although
color returned to the baby's body, it did not return to his hands and feet.
Despite intensive efforts to regain perfusion,l by the third day of hospi-
talization the child's arms were black from below his elbows to his fin-
gertips, and his legs were black from his mid-thigh to his toes. The child
subsequently underwent amputation of his arms and legs.2
This real-life case3 is an example of the nightmarish results that can
occur when non-physician corporate personnel make emergency life and
death decisions over the telephone, and when HMOs make decisions
1. Perfusion is the injecting of fluid or blood into or through an organ or structure of the
body in order to thoroughly permeate it. Re-establishing vascular circulation in the limbs can be
attempted through various medical techniques including use of blood thinners and vasodilators.
See ROBERT E. ROTHENBERG, M.D., F.A.C.S., THE NEW AMERICAN MEDICAL DICTIONARY AND
HEALTH MANUAL 240 (3d rev. ed. 1975).
2. According to hospital records, the child specifically underwent bilateral wrist
disarticulation, right below knee amputation, and left knee disarticulation. See Adams v. Kaiser
Found. Health Plan of Georgia, Inc., No. 93-VS-79895-E (Fulton County, Ga., Feb. 2, 1995); see
also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW, MED. LITIG. ALERT, July 1995, at 16-19; see also Thomas
William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health Care: A Plaintif's Perspective, 32
TORT & INS. L.J. 123, (1996), available in WL.
3. See Adams v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Georgia, Inc., No. 93-VS-79895-E (Fulton
County, Ga., Feb. 2, 1995); see also MEDICAL MALPRACICE REVIEW, MED. LITIG. ALERT, July
1995, at 16-19; see also Malone & Thaler, supra note 2.
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regarding emergency care based upon financial criteria rather than medi-
cal criteria. In this instance, a decision was made to send the patient to
the cheapest hospital, not the nearest hospital.4 Traditionally, this kind
of claim, if brought against an HMO, might be dismissed based upon
legal technicalities discussed in this article,5 and might result in plain-
tiffs like James Adams, being left uncompensated for injuries caused by
the HMO's negligence.6 All of that may be changing.
The recent shift in clinical decision-making from doctors to man-
aged care providers has dramatically changed the ability of traditional
tort concepts to redress medical malpractice claims.7 This area of the
law is in a current state of flux. The Federal Employment Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"),8 which once seemed an impenetrable
wall that protected HMOs from liability in medical malpractice suits, is
crumbling, leaving HMOs subject to liability and vulnerable to accusa-
tions that they are practicing medicine without a license.
After the enactment of ERISA in 1974,9 it was extremely difficult
for plaintiffs to succeed in medical malpractice claims against HMOs.
In many cases, the state court claims were removed to federal court
where they were dismissed on the basis of ERISA preemption. 10 Ironi-
cally, ERISA, a law that was originally designed to protect workers, 1
has been used to harm workers and their families by denying them
recovery for their injuries.
Plaintiffs' attempts to sue HMOs are generally based on theories
which include direct corporate negligence, vicarious liability (actual
agency, agency-in-fact, and ostensible agency), breach of contract, unau-
thorized practice of medicine, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, equitable
estoppel, and negligent utilization review.' 2 Many of these theories
4. Id.
5. See infra parts V and VI.
6. In this particular case, however, the plaintiffs received a jury verdict of $45 million.
Defendant moved for a new trial and JNOV, and the parties settled for an undisclosed sum. It
should be noted that the attorneys for Kaiser did not raise any affirmative defenses in this case.
See Adams v. Kaiser, No. 93-VS-79895-E, Fulton County Ct., Ga. Feb. 2, 1995, Complaint,
Answer, Jury Verdict, Judgment, and Dismissal of Motion for New Trial and Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict.
7. See Barbara A. Ryan, Legislature Considers Revisiting Health Care; Proposed Bill Holds
HMO's Liable of Negligent Decisions, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at 5, 7.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
9. Id.
10. See generally Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, The Liability of Health Maintenance
Organizations, N.Y.L.J. , July 1, 1997, at 3.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(2) (1994) (noting that the well-being of millions depends upon the
soundness of employee benefit plans).
12. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 5.
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have proved unsuccessful, 13 and the Courts have been far from consis-
tent in their approach to such cases.' 4 If a case can get past the difficult
ERISA preemption hurdle, it faces additional obstacles in states that
have adopted the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine.15 Courts
applying this doctrine have circularly reasoned that since the doctrine
prohibits corporations from practicing medicine, corporations cannot be
held liable for medical malpractice.' 6
With more and more courts now holding that claims against HMOs
either fall within ERISA's narrow exemptions or are not preempted,
along with courts recognizing that HMO practices are crossing the line
and encroaching into the doctor-patient relationship,17 a trend is devel-
oping where HMOs are viewed as engaged in the practice of medicine.
It is not uncommon to find non-physician HMO personnel making medi-
cal decisions on the basis of financial considerations.18 Critics charac-
terize such policies by HMOs as the unauthorized practice of medicine,
and HMOs are increasingly finding themselves subject to liability and
public scorn. 19
Moreover, the debate between trying to provide low cost minimum
health care for the general public on the one hand, versus allowing law-
suits against HMOs which arguably would raise health care costs on the
other, has led to proposed legislation on both the state and federal
levels.20 This may ultimately obviate the need for further cases to inter-
weave these legal theories to establish liability.2'
HMOs will have to re-think their traditional lines of defense and
restructure their approach to doing business in order to avoid nightmares
like the James Adams story, as well as to rebuild public confidence,
13. See id. See also Lisa Panah, Common Tort Liability of Health Maintenance
Organizations, 29 J. HEALTH & HOsp. L. (1996) (for a good overview of various tort theories
utilized against HMOs).
14. See generally Malone & Thaler, supra note 2.
15. See generally Michael A. Dowell, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine Must Go,
HEALTHSPAN, Nov. 1994, at 7, available in WL.
16. See id.
17. See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141, at 143.
18. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 5.
19. See id.
20. See HMO Liability Bill Sent to Bush's Desk, UPI, May 12, 1997, available in WL.
Sponsors of proposed legislation say that "extending civil liability to HMOs will make the
burgeoning managed health care industry more responsible and accountable." Id. See also,
Ryan, supra note 7, at 5.
21. See, e.g., id.; HMO Liability Bill Sent to Bush's Desk, UPI, May 12, 1997, available in
WL. Sponsors of proposed legislation say that "extending civil liability to HMOs will make the
burgeoning managed health care industry more responsible and accountable." Id.
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minimize liability, and allow resources to be spent where they can do the
most good - on patient well-being.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The first medical malpractice case was recorded in England in 1374
involving a surgeon who was sued for negligent treatment of a wound.22
Public criticism of health care professionals is not a new phenomenon;
even the French philosopher Voltaire once commented: "Doctors are
men who prescribe medicines of which they know little, to cure diseases
of which they know less, in human beings of whom they know noth-
ing."23 Although the medical profession has come a long way since the
days of Voltaire, there still remain tremendous uncertainties inherent in
the task of healing and equally tremendous uncertainties in the legal
ramifications of that treatment.
It has long been established in the medical profession that the phy-
sician is the "captain of the ship" when it comes to taking care of his
patients.24 The doctor is ultimately responsible for all treatment, or lack
thereof, rendered to patients in his care.2 Each doctor even takes an
oath committing himself to these admirable standards:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judg-
ment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing... I will keep
pure and holy both my life and my art .. .In whatsoever houses I
enter, I will enter to help the sick, and I will abstain from all inten-
tional wrongdoing and harm, especially from abusing the bodies of
man or woman, bond or free. And whatsoever I shall see or hear in
the course of my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what
should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such
things to be holy secrets. Now if I carry out this oath, and break it
not, may I gain forever reputation among all men for my life and for
my art; but if I transgress it and forswear myself, may the opposite
befall me.26
The Hippocratic Oath,27 as it is known, embodies the noble ideals
of the medical profession and is taken by all physicians as they enter the
practice of medicine. After four years of pre-medical education, four
years of medical school, one year of internship, and three grueling years
22. See CHARLES KRAMER & DAVID KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (5th ed. 1983).
23. Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
24. See Liability Lawsuits: Casting a Wider Net, MED. & HEALTH, May 4, 1992, available in
1992 WL 2789972.
25. See generally Ralph 0. Bischof & David B. Nash, Managed Care Past, Present, and
Future, 80 MED. CLINICS N. Am. 225 (1996).
26. The Physician's Oath (also known as the Hippocratic Oath), in JOHN BARTLETr,
BARTLETr's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, 88 (15th ed. 1980).
27. See id.
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of residency in a teaching hospital,28 physicians go out into the world to
heal the sick and improve the quality of life for their fellow man. They
apply scientific principles etched in their minds from tireless study and
combine them with artistry, creativity, ingenuity, sensitivity, intuition,
innovation, and communication. This blend of art and science, along
with dedication, discipline, and compassion, has resulted in miraculous
medical advancements in recent history. The nature of the practice,
however, appears to be changing due to what some observors character-
ize as the intermeddling of a new participant: The HMO. Critics see the
HMO as medically untrained decision-maker who is dedicated not to
patient well-being, but to the financial well-being of its CEO and upper
level management. The critics have a point: Surveys show that HMO
executives are collecting as much as $15 million a year in salaries and
stock options.29 This is a far cry from medicine's humble and noble
origins.
The availability of medical care was relatively sparse in the early
1900's and the sick were often unable to see physicians for their ail-
ments.30 Health care, in general, was vastly inferior as compared with
today's level of care, and the corresponding increase in the average life
span today reflects the tremendous advancements in medicine. 31
Patients' expectations of the medical profession have also gone through
a metamorphosis which is correlative with the technological advances in
medicine. 32  Historically, it was difficult to get doctors to travel the
great distances required to visit the sick in a mostly agrarian society. 33
Consequently, if the sick were lucky enough to find a doctor or nurse,
28. See generally OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCH. OF MED. ADMISSIONS
INFORMATION (1997) (admissions criteria and curriculum brochure).
29. See 60 Minutes: HMO 19 (CBS News television broadcast, Oct. 1, 1995. "Critics of
HMOs say that while hospital services and general patient care are being cut to the bone, for-profit
HMOs have become the darlings of Wall Street, posting huge profits, and HMO executives are
collecting as much as $15 million a year in salaries and stock options." Id. "In 1994, the CEO's
of some of the largest for-profit HMO's received an average of 7 million each in compensation for
the year." Ross Perot, Intensive Care 163 (1995). Contrasting these figures are reports that some
HMOs are actually losing money. For example, according to John Harkey, president of Harkey &
Associates, Inc., a Nashville, Tenn., company that tracks HMOs, the average profit for an HMO in
Florida fell by more than half from 1995 to 1996, and continued to drop in 1997. See Susan R.
Miller, Pushing Back, The Daily Business Review, March 13, 1998, A8. Another example of
HMOs losing money is the California-based HMO Pacificare, Health Systems, Inc., which bailed
out of the Florida market in 1997 after reportedly losing approximately $20 million in 1996 and
$13 million in 1995. See id.
30. See generally Howard Brody, The Place of Ethics in Health Care Reform: Framing the
Health Reform Debate, Hastings Center Rep., May-June 1994.
31. See Perot, supra note 29, at 58.
32. See id.
33. Interview with Dr. Heriberto Manzor, Miami, FL (1997), (describing provision of medical
care in Ciego De Avila, Cuba in the 1960's and 1970's, and analogy to the early practice of
medicine in rural areas of the United States).
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patients were generally grateful for any comfort at all the health care
practitioner might be able to provide. It would naturally follow that
there were limited expectations from health care providers.
As medical science progressed and costs for services became more
expensive, patients' expectations naturally increased. Health care subse-
quently developed into a huge industry where profit is the bottom line.34
Medical costs can no longer be managed by a family bartering a chicken
for a doctor's house call. 35 Costs have steadily increased to the point
where, if not for insurance, most people could not afford health care at
all.36 Despite the high cost of health care, many Americans perceive
"access to quality health care as an entitlement . . . not as a luxury or
privilege."37 After decades of medical ethics norms reflecting no con-
cern for costs, a new era of a socially conscious approach to medicine
was dawning.
A. The Birth of HMOs
Managed health care first surfaced in the 1920s.38 The Community
Hospital of Elk City, Oklahoma, established the first medical coopera-
tive in 1927.19 Two years later, the Ross-Loos Medical Group entered
into an agreement with the Los Angeles Water and Power Department to
provide pre-paid medical care to Department employees.4n One of the
"grandfather" managed care companies, Kaiser Foundation Health
Plans, originated in the mid-1930's to provide medical care to Kaiser
employees who were working on the Grand Coulee Dam in Washing-
ton.41 During World War II, Kaiser Industries expanded its commitment
to provide quality health care for its employees at various construction
sites.42 During the 1950's and 1960's, other "HMOs" emerged, such as
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, the Health Insurance Plan of
Greater New York, and the Group Health Association of Washington,
34. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123. The net worth of Kaiser, for example,
increased from $14,186,093 in 1992, to $95,794,842 in 1995. See id. (citing Annual Statement of
the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Georgia, Inc. to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner
of the State of Georgia, for the Year Ending December 31, 1995 at 31).
35. See Manzor, supra note 33.
36. See COLODIA OWENS, MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
MEDICAL PRACTICES AND OTHER PROVIDERS 2 (1996).
37. Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation, Advances in Medical Technology, and the Advent of a
New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 336 (1996).
38. See Diana J. Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 291 (1995).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Domenick C. DiCicco Jr., Liability of The HMO For The Medical Negligence of Its
Providers, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP., Nov. 1996, at 22.
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D.C.4 3 Nevertheless, managed health care organizations remained unu-
sual, compared to the traditional fee-for-service health insurance where
doctors submit claim forms for each service they determine to be neces-
sary." Although fee-for-service health insurance was much more com-
mon, not everyone could afford it.4 5
Since health insurance was particularly expensive for the unem-
ployed and elderly, the federal government initiated the Medicaid pro-
grams and Medicare in 1965.46 Medicaid provides health services to the
poor, while Medicare provides health services to the elderly and dis-
abled.47 Individual states determined how physicians were paid under
Medicaid reimbursement, whereas Medicare reimbursed physicians for
"customary and reasonable charges."48
In the early part of the 1970's, Democrats led by Senator Edward
Kennedy began to cultivate public support to develop national health
insurance.49 The Republicans supported private alternatives to tradi-
tional health care plans, and the two parties ultimately agreed to pass the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.50 The Act provided fed-
eral grants for development of HMOs, and loans to subsidize their initial
expenses.5" Thus, the term "Health Maintenance Organizations"
("HMOs") was coined.52 After the Act passed, growth of HMOs was
dramatic: In 1972 there were fewer than forty HMOs, with approxi-
mately three million members; by 1985, there were 263 HMOs, with
more than eighteen million members.53 Recent figures show the
national total of Americans who receive their medical care through
HMOs exceeds 56 million.54 Currently, approximately eighty percent of
those with medical insurance are influenced in some way by managed
43. See id.
44. See id. See also Allison Faber Walsh, Comment, The Legal Attack on Cost Containment
Mechanisms: The Expansion of Liability For Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 207, 211.
45. See Christine C. Dodd, Comment, The Exclusion of Non-Physician Health-Care
Providers from Integrated Delivery Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate Business Practice? 64
U. CN. L. REV. 983, 983 (1996); see also Walsh, supra note 44, at 211-12.
46. See E. Jane Ross, Refusing to Pay for Health Care-Part I (of I): Evolution of the Third-
Party Payment System, PROGRESS IN CARDIOVASCULAR NURSING, Winter 1996, at 42, 43.
47. See id.
48. See Ross, supra note 46 at 43.
49. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
50. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17. See also
DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
51. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
52. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
53. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
54. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2. The figure of 51 Million has also been quoted. See
20/20: The Ultimate Cost (ABC News broadcast, Mar. 1, 1996) [hereinafter 20/20].
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care.55 Projections suggest that ninety percent of the drug market will be
influenced by managed care by the year 2000.56
Though managed care has been around for several decades, its
widespread popularity is new. 57 Extensive growth in recent years has
led to consolidation within the industry.58 Most notably in the 1980's,
many sociological factors combined to cause dramatic increases in the
cost of health care. Many insurance companies claimed that they were
not making profits and were actually losing money on health care.
Insurance premiums began to escalate and restrictions on covered serv-
ices were implemented. 59 Health care has been transformed from an
indemnity model-where payment is made after care is rendered-to a
prospective payment system where coverage is determined before the
care is rendered.60 HMOs began using "utilization review agents"6 or
"case managers" to monitor the length of hospital stays and medical
necessity of treatment. Such monitoring translates into restrictions, and
arguably, control of medical decision making.6 2 In many cases, case
managers are non-medical personnel who make medical decisions based
on financial considerations.63 It has been reported that HMOs, in order
to control costs, "withhold appropriate diagnostic procedures and treat-
ments ... ; delay or even deny necessary treatments altogether; or elect
the least expensive approach; which is often contrary to the patient's
best interest."'  Many HMO physicians are prohibited by "gag
clauses '65 in their contracts from disclosing expensive alternatives to
patients. HMOs further cut costs by requiring manufacturers of medical
devices and pharmaceuticals to offer a cheaper "managed care product
55. See BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR U.S.
PHARMACEUTICALS 18 (Apr. 1993).
56. See id.
57. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
58. See id. Aetna recently acquired U.S. Healthcare, Inc. for $8.9 billion in cash and stock,
creating the nation's largest managed health care company. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at
125.
59. See Walsh, supra note 44, at 213-15.
60. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 7.
61. See id. Utilization review agents and case managers review all proposed medical
treatment and decide, based on established company guidelines, whether treatment will be
approved. See id.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Edward Hirschfield, The Case For Physician Direction in Health Plans, 3
ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 81, 91-92 (1994) (discussing adverse implications of non-physician control
over HMO decisions).
64. Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123 (citations omitted).
65. See Jennifer L. D'Isidori, note, Stop Gagging Physicians!, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 187, 205
(1997). Gag clauses which preclude physicians from disclosing available procedures and options
to patients may leave the physicians liable in a medical malpractice suit for failure to obtain
informed consent. See generally id.
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line."66
Ironically, HMOs may be withholding medical treatment or select-
ing the cheapest alternative medical treatment at a time when some of
the most remarkable advancements in science are occurring.67 For
example, there have been exponential advances in molecular biology in
the past five years, driven in part by the Human Genome Project.68
There are numerous genetic products in various stages of development
and some have already reached the marketplace.6 9 An entire generation
of therapeutics, diagnostics, and genetic tests are on the verge of
implementation.70
B. Medical Ethics
It is difficult to justify cost considerations prevailing over patient
well-being in the overall scheme of medical ethics, but this appears to be
the case today. Traditionally, the contrary view was the norm. Modem
medical ethics has developed from two distinct schools of thought-one
of "professional domination," and the other of "interdisciplinary
bioethics."' 1 In the earlier era of professional domination, ethical con-
cepts were used to create codes of professional conduct which doctors
imposed and enforced on themselves.72 These ethical principles primar-
ily existed to maintain order in the profession and foster public respect
for professional authority. Physicians defined patient well-being in a
highly paternalistic and authoritarian fashion: "[B]eneficence-the best
interest of the patient as determined by his or her care-giver-served as
the guiding principle. 73
The second ethics era, the era of bioethics, commenced in approxi-
mately 1970.74 Bioethics was based upon individual rights and patient
autonomy, not on what the doctor deemed to be in the patient's best
interest.75 This view is exemplified by the legal innovation, the
"informed consent doctrine."7 6 Under this doctrine, the doctor's role is
viewed as executing the instructions of a fully informed master - the
66. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
67. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 332.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 332-33.
70. See id. at 333.
71. See id at 334.
72. Doctors' codes of professional conduct were self-enforced, primarily through boards and
institutional proceedings. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
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patient.77 Both the professional dominance and bioethics approaches
reflect a commitment to patients' medical interests, without concern for
costs, regardless of any resulting inefficient distribution of societal
resources.78 Patients are generally unaware of the cost of medical care,
including medicines and treatments, and rely on their doctors to deter-
mine the best course of action. Doctors have confidence that insurance
companies will pay for the treatments they recommend.79
As a result of these inefficiencies, health care is entering a third era
of medical ethics, the "Cost Conscious Era" or "Socioethics Era."80
Under this model, medical ethics is more utilitarian, where the rights of
each patient are balanced against the utilitarian principle of doing the
greatest good for the greatest number of people.8' Managed care claims
that utilitarianism is its underlying principle, but implementation of this
philosophy boils down to payers setting limits. HMOs effectively limit
both physician discretion and patient autonomy,8" by dividing the physi-
cian's loyalty between patient and society.83
This new role for physicians is at odds with traditional tort princi-
ples and leaves doctors in a precarious position: "It is one thing to have
a societal policy where limited resources are allocated based on wealth
rather than a more equitable distribution. It is quite another to have a
policy where basic health care and the preservation of life itself are also
to be allocated."84 Because of the heart-wrenching difficulty in balanc-
ing individual interests and the value of a human life with the burdens
and benefits to society in general, it is not surprising that society has
turned to the courts for guidance.
C. Increasing Litigation
The view that there is a "right" to medical care may have fueled, in
part, the increasing number of medical malpractice lawsuits. The suc-
77. See id.
78. See id at 334-35. "[tlhe health care industry represents the largest single sector of the
U.S. economy. The United States spends nearly fifteen percent of its gross domestic product on
health care-$900 billion in 1993-and that figure continues to rise at a rate of approximately
9.2% per year." Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
79. See id at 336-37.
80. See id. at 337.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 338.
83. See Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 149. In addition, HMOs are adopting measures to make
physicians more conscious of costs, often paying bonuses to physicians who minimize the cost of
patient care. Such incentives create a triple loyalty for physicians-to patients, to society, and to
their own financial interests. See id.
84. See Mark A. Rothstein, The Ethics of Tiered Health Care, HEALTH L. NEWS, Sept. 1995,
at 2-3.
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cess of such lawsuits may have encouraged even more litigation.85 It
appears that consumers consider health care an exact science with guar-
anteed results. If patients do not get the results they expect, lawsuits
follow. A boom in the legal profession and a flood in the legal jobs
market led to many new attorneys clamoring for cases that would enable
them to keep their practices afloat.86 Consequently, cases that attorneys
once may have rejected were now being pursued.
Attorney advertising may also have been a factor in the increasing
medical malpractice litigation.87 In a series of cases beginning in 1977,
the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the American Bar
Association's long-held ban on attorney advertising.88 By the early
1980's most states had adopted a modified version of the ABA's Model
Code89 which permitted limited attorney advertising.9" Since 1983 more
than 35 states have revised their ethical rules to conform to the ABA's
Model Rules9' which are even more liberal than the Model Code with
regard to advertising.92 As lawyer advertising increased over the last
two decades, it became easier for people to obtain lawyers. Conse-
quently, more patients filed lawsuits against their doctors and hospitals.
Many lawsuits have been filed sheerly for nuisance value. 93 Large
settlements and jury verdicts may have encouraged even more law-
suits. 94 Insurance companies providing professional liability coverage
were forced to increase doctors' premiums in order to cover malpractice
settlements and awards. 9s As a result, many physicians have elected to
85. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 543 (7th Cir. 1997).
86. See Kathleen Eleanor Justice, There Goes The Monopoly: The California Proposal to
Allow NonLawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179, 193 (1991).
87. See Jeffrey M. Croasdell, Regulation of Attorney Advertising Under State Constitutional
Freedom of Speech Provisions, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1457, 1467-68 (1995).
88. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 491 (Little,
Brown and Company ed., 3d ed. 1989).
89. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1983), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS 421-99 (Little, Brown and Company ed., 1997).
90. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 89, at 421.
91. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983,
1989-1996), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3-420 (Little, Brown and Company ed., 1997).
92. See id. at 421.
93. Nuisance value is where the cost of defending a suit at trial is so great that any settlement
under this amount represents a savings to the defendant. See Ted Schmeyer, Legal Process
Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers' Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371,
390 (1998).
94. See Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice and Physician Accountability: Trends in
the Courts and Legislative Responses, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 105-14 (1994) (discussing
recent judicial decisions that have broadened liability for malpractice, as well as the costs
associated with expanded liability).
95. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 543 (7th Cir. 1997). See also 23%
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go without insurance, structuring their personal assets in a manner which
protects them from judgment.96 Many physicians have also responded
to this "medical malpractice crisis" by practicing what is known as
"defensive medicine"-performing tests and procedures that may not be
medically necessary in order to safeguard against liability. 97 It is com-
mon in medical malpractice cases for plaintiffs' lawyers to allege a
"failure to diagnose" and "failure to perform appropriate diagnostic pro-
cedures," along with other theories of negligence. In order to overcome
the difficulty of being held to retrospective diagnostic standards, doctors
began performing expensive diagnostic tests and procedures which they
otherwise might not have found necessary.
Traditional indemnity insurance companies tended not to question
these diagnostic tests and were required by contract to pay for all or a
portion of their cost. The physician determined the appropriateness of
the tests and treatments, not the insurance company. 98 Performing the
battery of tests would take the wind out of the sails of plaintiffs' attor-
neys in later malpractice lawsuits. Plaintiffs would find it difficult to
assert that proper diagnostic tests were not performed if virtually every
medical test imaginable had been performed. This arrangement benefit-
ted both the physician, who protected himself from potential lawsuits,
and the patient, who would be assured that everything possible was
being done. On the other hand, patients were being subjected to unnec-
essary procedures, many of which were uncomfortable, burdensome,
and even risky. In addition, the high costs associated with such tests
dramatically increased the value of claims paid by health insurance
companies.99
The situation reached what many perceived as critical proportions,
and thereafter, political cartoons began appearing in newspapers around
the country. One example depicts a patient lying in a hospital bed with
Liability Rate Increase Request Pegged to Managed Care, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1996, at 43
(discussing a Texas insurance company's request to increase professional liability rates by
22.9%). "One of the largest professional liability insurers in Texas says the use of primary
physicians as "gatekeepers" is a major factor behind its need to raise rates by 22.9 percent for this
type of coverage .... '[W]e have identified increased losses due to misdiagnosis ... what we're
saying is that managed care puts greater responsibility on primary care physicians .... '). Id.
96. See e.g., Frank J. Yong, What's Mine is Mine, Part IV: In Case of a Judgment, CENTRAL
FLORIDA PHYSICIAN, Jan. 1990, at 14. This is the last in a four-part series on protecting assets from
malpractice and creditors' claims under Florida law.
97. See AM. MED. NEWS, supra note 95; See generally Kenneth R. Pedroza, Note, Cutting Fat
or Cutting Comers, Health Care Delivery and Its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 399 (1996) (discussing defensive medicine).
98. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 338; see also Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial
Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians Be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83
GEO. L.J. 1821, 1822 (1995).
99. See LeBlang, supra note 94.
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countless tubes, wires, monitors, x-ray machines, and IV's hooked up to
him, and surrounded by an army of medical staff. One doctor asks
another: "What is this patient being treated for?" The other responds:
"He only has a cold, but he's an attorney so we're not taking any
chances.""°°
D. Tort Reform
Legislators began to address the detrimental affect frivolous law-
suits were having on health care costs, and consequently, on people's
access to health care. In Florida, for example, the legislature enacted the
Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 198511 to ensure
that Florida citizens have access to competent and reasonably priced
medical services."°2 The Act intended to control escalating premiums
for professional liability insurance,' °3 by requiring potential plaintiffs to
follow stringent procedures prior to filing a medical malpractice suit.' 4
Prior to initiating a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must obtain an
affidavit from a qualified medical expert who has determined that there
are reasonable grounds to initiate a malpractice claim. 1 5 The plaintiff
must then notify all potential defendants; each potential defendant is
required to conduct an investigation within 90 days and then respond by
offering a settlement, denying the claim, or offering to admit liability
and arbitrate the issue of damages. 10 6 During the 90-day pre-suit period,
the parties may conduct informal discovery and obtain unsworn state-
ments. 10 7 The requirements of this Act, in conjunction with the diffi-
culty in obtaining medical experts willing to sign affidavits, have
eliminated many frivolous lawsuits.'0 8
Additionally, the Florida Legislature enacted the Florida Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan0 9 which, among other
things, limits the non-economic damages that can be awarded for birth-
related neurological injury claims."' The Legislature was concerned
100. The source of this cartoon cannot be located.
101. Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (1997).
102. See Honorable Nelly N. Khouzam, Medical Malpractice: A Review of the Presuit
Screening Provisions of the Florida Medical Malpractice Act, 20 NOVA L. REV. 453, 4563-54
(1995).
103. See id.
104. FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (1997).
105. FLA. STAT. § 766.203(2) (1997).
106. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2)-(3) (1997).
107. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6)-(7) (1997).
108. See generally, Khouzam, supra note 102.
109. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan ("NICA" Statute), FLA.
STAT. § 766.301-766.316 (1997).
110. FLA. STAT. § 766.31(1)(b) (1997).
[Vol. 53:195
TAKE HALF AN ASPIRIN AND CALL YOUR HMO
about increases in professional liability coverage for obstetricians result-
ing from huge jury verdicts"' in cases involving hypoxic brain damage
at birth.' 12 The increased liability exposure and cost of professional lia-
bility insurance were causing doctors to refuse to deliver babies-an
obviously critical service to society." 3
Tort reform legislation was only one attempt to resolve this multi-
faceted societal problem. Insurance companies responded by adjusting
their structures to implement cost-cutting measures. Increasing HMO-
type plans were the result.
E. Increasing Presence of HMOs
Spiraling medical costs and malpractice lawsuits led the insurance
industry to restructure its coverages and raise premiums. 114 As a result,
traditional health insurance became cost-prohibitive. Employers who
wanted to provide health care coverage to employees were finding them-
selves unable to do so.' Employers turned to HMOs which, because of
their structure, were able to provide affordable health care while contain-
ing health care costs.
An HMO is a health care financing and delivery system in which
enrolled members pay a pre-paid, fixed fee for future medical care. 116
HMOs differ from the traditional fee-for-service payment system, where
patients pay a fee for each service provided by their individual doc-
tors.' 17 There are variations on this kind of plan known as preferred
provider organizations (PPOs) and point-of-service plans (POS)." '8
HMOs reduce costs in a number of ways. One of the ways is by
limiting the members' choices of physicians and hospitals.'" 9 HMOs
restrict their members' choice of physicians to a limited list of providers
I ll. FLA. STAT. § 766.301(2)(1997) (stating the intent of the legislature "to provide
compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class of catastrophic injuries that result in
unusually high costs for custodial care and rehabilitation").
112. Hypoxia is the decrease below normal levels of oxygen in inspired gases, arterial blood,
or tissue. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1990). A "Birth-related neurological
injury" is defined as "injury to the brain or spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2,500
grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occuring in the course of labor,
delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate post delivery period in a hospital which renders the
infant permanently and substantially mentally impaired." FLA. STAT. § 766.302(2) (1997).
113. FLA. STAT. § 766.301 (1997).
114. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
115. See Pedroza, supra note 97, at 405.
116. See Panah, supra note 13, at 146.
117. See id.
118. See generally Michael Kanute, Comment, Evolving Theories of Malpractice Liability for
HMOs, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841 (1989).
119. See Darrin Schlegel, Putting the Squeeze on HMOs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 2,
1997, at 10A.
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who have contracted with, or who are employed by the HMO. 120 Prov-
iders agree to fee concessions in exchange for a steady flow of
patients, 12 ' and participating providers agree to be compensated on a
"capitated"'' 2 2 or discounted fee-for-service basis. 123 Under the typical
capitation arrangement, providers agree to accept a predetermined
amount per HMO subscriber, regardless of the amount or type of service
provided. '
4
In addition, HMOs attempt to reduce costs by focusing on the med-
ical management of patients and limiting the amount they pay to provid-
ers for medical services. This is accomplished by (1) eliminating
unnecessary care; (2) providing care more efficiently; (3) reducing costs
by creating economies of large scale; (4) coordinating care among physi-
cians and hospitals; (5) and mandating the use of guidelines,
algorhythms, or parameters of care (utilization guidelines).12 5
Some cost containment measures are aimed at patients, while others
are aimed at providers. Some of the measures aimed at patients include:
(1) avoiding the need for acute care by focusing on preventative care; (2)
restricting use of physicians to those who have agreed to accept lower
reimbursement; (3) denying access to emergency care by redefining and
identifying emergency situations; and (4) denying access to specialists
unless referred by the primary care physician. 26
Cost containment measures aimed at providers include: (1) requir-
ing that providers discount from their usual fees; (2) withholding per-
centages of fees unless provider meets utilization goals; and (3)
participating in capitation schemes, whereby the provider receives a set
amount per patient for a specified period of time. 27 During that period,
the provider is expected to provide all necessary services for HMO
patients. If the patient requires care in excess of the amount the HMO
doctor has been paid, the doctor must absorb the financial loss. 128 If the
patient does not use the service, the physician realizes a gain since the
120. See Panah, supra note 13, at 146.
121. See id.
122. See Frances H. Miller, Health Care Capitated Payment Systems-Foreword: The Promise
and Problems of Capitation, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 167 (1996). Capitation is one of three forms of
base pay used by HMOs. The other two are salary and fee-for service. See Mark A. Hall,
Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 772 (1994).
123. See Panah, supra note 13, at 146.
124. See id.
125. See COUNSEL OF ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MANAGED CARE (1994) reprinted in 273 JAMA 330, at 331; see also Malone
& Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
126. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 123.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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HMO has already paid for the services.12 9 This may vary, of course,
depending on the type of HMO plan involved.
III. TYPES OF HMOs
Since many courts consider the type of HMO in analyzing liability,
it is useful to understand the three basic models. 130 The traditional form
of HMO is the "Staff Model," in which physicians are employed by the
HMO.131 The idea behind this type of HMO is that the doctor will be
freed from the day-to-day responsibilities of managing a practice and
able to focus on providing the best possible patient care. Since the
HMO is the physician's employer, it will usually be liable under the
traditional theory of respondeat superior. 32
Another type of HMO is the "Group Individual Practice Associa-
tion" (IPA) Model, which is currently the most common form of man-
aged care. 133 Under this model, a group of doctors who have formed a
partnership or corporation contracts with the HMO to provide care for
its members.' 34 The physicians' association then contracts directly with
each doctor regarding terms and payment. 135 The doctors may be per-
mitted to treat fee-for-service patients as well as HMO members,
although some contracts require doctors to see only HMO patients.
136
Here, the negotiating power of a group of doctors is stronger than that of
the employee doctors in the staff model. Additionally, allowing the doc-
tors to generate additional income by treating fee-for-service patients
may be attractive to doctors and entice them to participate.
37
Treating non-HMO patients, however, may lead to conflicts,
including competition for the same appointment time slots. Doctors are
paid in advance for HMO patients on a capitated basis, but fee-for-ser-
vice patients represent additional income. Under this arrangement there
is an incentive for doctors not to see HMO patients, or, at least, not to
spend a lot of time with such patients, if they can earn additional income
by seeing fee-for-service patients.138
The third type of HMO is the "Group (non-IPA) Model" or "Net-
129. See id.
130. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
131. See id.
132. See id. "Respondeat superior" is the common-law doctrine holding an employer or
principal liable for the employee's or agent's actions (including torts) committed during the scope
of employment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1991).
133. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 139.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See DiCicco, supra note 42, at 22.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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work Model." '139 Under this arrangement, the HMO provides medical
care for its members through individual physician groups or entities hav-
ing provider employees. Group practices are often multi-specialty
groups.'4 ° Instead of one group of physicians servicing the patients, sev-
eral groups provide the health care. The more control the HMO has
over the health care provider, the more the HMOs liability increases. 4'
A patient who belongs to an HMO generally selects a "primary care
physician" from the list of participating physicians. The primary care
physician is usually a family doctor or general practitioner. The HMO
pays the physician a predetermined periodic amount for each patient
who selects him as the primary doctor (capitation).' 42 Whenever the
patient needs to see the doctor, he makes an appointment and sees the
physician for either no charge or a nominal fee. If referrals to specialists
are needed, the primary care physician must make the referral, and if
possible, the referral must be to a specialist within the network of physi-
cians participating in that HMO. All treatment must be coordinated by
the primary treating physician, and all tests and procedures must be pre-
approved by the HMO. The HMO determines in advance what tests and
treatments it will and will not pay for.'4 3 In theory, the system looks
like it could be a viable solution to some of the nation's health care
problems. In practice, however, the system leaves a lot to be desired and
has been the target of widespread criticism.'"
IV. CRITICISM OF HMOs
A. Inferior Care
In recent years, HMOs have come under attack for a variety of
reasons. One complaint is that patients feel that they have lost their
freedom of choice over which doctors will take care of them.' 5 Patients
also complain that many of the doctors participating in the HMOs are
not as good as those who do not participate and that incompetent practi-
tioners are being employed or retained by the HMOs.' 46 Doctors' deci-
sions of whether or not to participate in HMOs may be based in part
upon the laws of supply and demand and the doctor's income-generating
needs. "'47 Doctors with a good reputation and an established practice
139. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2, at 138.
140. See id.
141. See DiCicco, supra note 42.
142. See generally Miller, supra note 122.
143. See id. at 169.
144. See Moore & Gaier, supra note 10.
145. See Panah, supra note 13.
146. See Moore & Gaier, supra note 10.
147. See D'Isidori, supra note 65, at 193.
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may not be in a position where they need a flow of new patients. These
doctors, therefore, may not need to make the fee concessions required by
HMOs.
148
Another criticism is that many of the physicians who participate in
HMOs are those trying to build a practice and lack adequate expertise
and reputation. Many of the practitioners who are competent complain
that they are being overruled regarding diagnoses and recommended
courses of treatment by a "medical director" whose primary concern is
not the well-being of the patient.' 49 Many good physicians are being
forced out of the business simply because they refuse to bend to the
demands of the HMOs and continue to practice what they feel is
medicine in the best interest of their patients. 50 Many other physicians
complain that HMOs have double crossed them by pressuring them to
take less for the services they provide, and by failing to pay them on a
timely basis, if at all.1"
HMO patients also claim that necessary treatment is being withheld
in order to cut costs. One such cost-cutting practice was to send
mothers and their babies home "dangerously soon" after birth. 5 ' This
practice has been the focus of state and federal legislation. 153  Another
dangerous cost-cutting measure has been to deny requests for biopsies.
In one case where an HMO physician neligently failed to order a needed
biopsy, the result was spread of cancer cells, metastasis throughout the
body, and death, all of which could have been prevented by a simple
biopsy. 54 In this type of case, plaintiffs' lawyers might argue that doc-
tors' decisions to withhold treatments, such as pap smears and biopsies
are inappropriately influenced by undisclosed financial incentives. 155
Plaintiffs' lawyers also argue that one of the common bases for
denial of coverage-the "experimental" nature of treatment-is inappro-
148. See Schlegel, supra note 119.
149. See Moore & Gaier, supra note 10. See also Carlos Sanchez, News, Senate Plan Would
Increase Liability of HMO's In Texas, THE FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, [insert date], at 19
(Doctors complaints of having to get HMO permission for certain treatments, permission based
upon financial instead of medical treatment).
150. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29, at 18.
151. See Susan R. Miller, Pushing Back, MIAMI DAILY BUSINESS REVIEW, Mar. 13, 1998, at A-
9.
152. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 335.
153. See "Drive-Through" Baby Deliveries Bill Picks Up Steam, CONGRess DAILY, Mar. 29,
1996, available in 1996 WL 5515467. See also Patricia A. Smith, HMO's Immunity Challenged,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW & STRATEGY, May 1998, at 1 (referring to the federal Newborns'
and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996).
154. See McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996) (holding that
an HMO was liable for physician under ostensible agency theory when physician negligently
failed to order a biopsy, where the HMO had advertised that it carefully screened its physicians).
155. See Hall, supra note 122, at 708.
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priate. In one such case, a California jury held a prominent HMO liable
for denying coverage of a breast cancer patient's bone marrow transplant
which the HMO argued was "experimental" treatment. 56 The jury
awarded $89.1 million to the family of the deceased patient. 57 Evi-
dence introduced at trial showed that the HMOs medical director was
compensated based upon the amount of money he saved the company. 15 8
In addition to refusing to cover so-called experimental treatment, HMOs
are eliminating support for medical research and development.' 59 This
is another signal of the trend toward emphasizing quantity of care rather
than quality of care.
B. Volume Healthcare
Another common complaint is that HMOs provide mass-produc-
tion, clinic-like treatment that is inferior. Since one of the objectives of
HMOs is to lower costs by increasing volume, doctors have to see more
patients, and consequently, have less time to spend with each patient. 16
Appointments are over-booked and patients are kept waiting an inordi-
nate amount of time in crowded waiting rooms. Patients also have diffi-
culty getting immediate appointments and often have to wait weeks to
get an appointment. When the patient is finally seen, the time spent with
the doctor is so short that the patient is left feeling as though he is not
receiving proper care. Volume health care and quality health care
appear to be mutually exclusive.
By way of analogy, the Home Depot chain of large volume, ware-
house-size, mega-hardware-stores has squeezed out the mom-and-pop
corner hardware store by lowering prices (made possible by volume
business). Similarly, HMOs are squeezing out the private family doctor
and approaching health care as a volume commodity. The imagination
would not have to stretch too far to envision "Medical Depot" chains
popping up around the country, with "Labor Day Weekend Blowout
Sales on by-pass surgery." The point is that the Norman Rockwell por-
trait of a visit with the family doctor is a thing of the past. Health care
today is based upon numbers and capitation.
156. See Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993).
157. See id.
158. See Hall, supra note 122, at 708.
159. See Science and Technology, Health Policy: Managing to Care, THE ECONOMIST, Sept.
23, 1995, at 70, 75.
160. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Preserving the Doctor-Patient Relationship in the Era of
Managed Care, JAMA, Jan. 25, 1995 at 323 (doctors can spend only 11 minutes with each patient
on an average day).
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C. Capitation Schemes
"Capitation" is one of the more common complaints against HMOs
and has attracted significant television news coverage. 6' Capitation is a
form of HMO reimbursement whereby the doctor is compensated at a
flat rate for each patient enrolled in the HMO for a specific time
period.' 62 Doctors are paid a pre-determined fixed fee based upon the
number of patient subscribers. 163 The doctor receives the same amount
for each patient on a monthly basis regardless of the services provided to
the patient or how much those services cost."64 If a patient does not
require any medical service during a particular month, the doctor still
receives a monthly payment. 165 On the other hand, if a doctor has to
provide care beyond the projected amount, the doctor is not paid any
additional amount for the extra services provided to the patient.'
66
Since under a capitated system the financial risk of caring for the
participants shifts to the primary care physician, 61 the thrust of the criti-
cism is that capitation creates a disincentive for doctors to see and treat
the patients for which they have already been paid a flat fee by the
HMO.' 68 If a doctor has a choice of seeing a non-HMO patient who will
generate additional money for the practice and seeing an HMO patient
for whom the doctor has already been paid, the doctor has a financial
incentive to see the non-HMO patient. If the doctor also has to utilize
staff and supplies to treat the HMO patient for which he has already
been paid, that represents an expense and loss of profit for the doctor.
If, on the other hand, the doctor sees the non-HMO patient, the doctor
has the opportunity to make additional money and increase profitability.
The net effect is that HMO patients feel they are getting low priority and
inferior care. Disgruntled patients who question their doctor's motiva-
tion for not providing medical treatment then seek redress in court.
1 6 9
HMOs have created tremendous liability problems for doctors.' 7 °
161. Telephone interview with Robin Kish, Television News Journalist, Miami, Florida, Nov.
18, 1997, regarding her investigative report, Dr. Dilemma (NBC 6 television broadcast Oct. 31,
1997)(transcript on file with Robin Kish at NBC 6); See also 60 Minutes, supra note 29; 20/20,
supra note 54.
162. See Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be on
American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1364-65.
163. See Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 158.
164. See Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians
be Required to Disclose These to Patients?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1827 (1995).
165. See id.
166. See Walsh, supra note 44, at 219.
167. See McGraw, supra note 164, at 1827.
168. See Orentlicher, supra note 17, at 157.
169. See Walsh, supra note 44, at 221.
170. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 356.
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As doctors are forced to assume the role of "gatekeeper" for the HMO,
primarily concerned with keeping costs down, patients are falling
through gaps between providers.171 As a result, patients are becoming
angry and suing their doctors and insurance companies. 172 Not everyone,
however, is critical of capitation. Despite the inherent problems with
capitation, President Clinton's health care reform proposal in 1996 advo-
cated capitation as the primary form of reimbursement in HMOs as well
as for Medicaid and Medicare recipients. 7 3 Although capitation aims
to correct over-treatment incentives, it tends to lead to under-treatment
because doctors earn more by providing less care, and fewer tests and
referrals. 174
D. Utilization Management
Another criticism of HMOs is the issue of "Utilization Manage-
ment." Many view utilization review as a significant intrusion into the
physician-patient relationship. This is due to the fact that life and death
decisions between physician and patient are trivialized by the utilization
review's emphasis on costs versus benefits. 175 There are three types of
utilization review: (1) prospective utilization review, (2) concurrent util-
ization review, and (3) retrospective review.
Prospective utilization review is performed by the HMO prior to
the administration of treatment. 176 The utilization manager determines
whether the doctor's recommended treatment for the patient is medically
necessary. 177 If the proposed treatment is not deemed to be medically
necessary, the HMO will not reimburse the cost of the treatment.1 78
Concurrent utilization review occurs during the treatment course to
determine whether proposed treatment is medically necessary. The
HMO case manager monitors the patient throughout treatment to deter-
mine whether each procedure is medically necessary. 179
The last type of utilization review, retrospective review, occurs
after treatment is already rendered.180 If a review of the treatment ren-
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans,
22 Am. J.L. & MED. 301 (1996).
174. See Elizabeth 0. Teisberg et al., Making Competition in Health Care Work, HARV. Bus.
REv., July-Aug. 1994, at 131, 135.
175. See David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients'
Trust in Medical Care and their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693, 1695 (1996).
176. See Patricia A. Younger et al., MANAGED CARE L. MAN. 2 (1996).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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dered indicates that a medical service was unnecessary, the HMO will
deny payment. 8' Doctors, in particular are critical of utilization man-
agement because it undermines their authority regarding prescribed
courses of treatment for their patients. According to one authority, "the
general concern is that managed care reduces physicians, once the ulti-
mate health care decision makers, to proverbial cogs in a very large and
impersonal health care machine." '82 There is particularly strong criti-
cism of HMOs insistence on pre-approving emergency care. As Texas
state Senator Jane Nelson put it, "When you're sick, you don't want to
spend 30 minutes on the phone just to hear a data processor at a com-
puter tell you that you don't need medical treatment. When my child is
gasping for breath in a pool of blood, I know its an emergency and I'm
not going to waste time calling an HMO for approval to get her to the
hospital." 183
E. Financial Incentives
Traditional health insurance gave doctors an incentive to do as
many tests and procedures as could be medically justified at the doctor's
discretion.'184 The more medical treatment a doctor provided, the more
money he could make.185 Moreover, the more tests he ordered, the less
liability he faced for medical malpractice.' 86 Under the HMO structure,
incentives to do too much have been replaced with incentives to do too
little. "'87 Payment incentives such as risk pools, bonuses, capitation,
fines and penalties are utilized to discourage referrals, diagnostic tests
and other medical services. These payment incentives encourage doc-
tors to use fewer outside services and also reward the doctor for fewer
referrals, tests and medical services incurred by the HMO.' 88 Payment
incentives are used to encourage physicians to provide cost-effective
medical care but may instead be resulting in sub-standard care.
The first kind of incentive, "risk pools," is a system wherein a por-
tion of the doctor's capitated income is withheld and placed in a pool
along with the withholdings from other doctor-members. 8 9 Money
181. See id.
182. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 351.
183. See Schlegel, supra note 119, at 10-A.
184. See Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 79,
80 (1994).
185. See id.
186. See Schwartz, supra note 162, at 1361.
187. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 338; see also Patricia M. Danzon, et al, Consolidation
Is a Tonic For Health Care Providers, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 1995, at B14.
188. See Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt
to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1997).
189. See Walsh, supra note 44, at 219.
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from the risk pool is used to pay for referrals to specialists and also for
hospitalization costs.19° Doctor-members divide any funds left in the
pool at the end of the accounting period, 191 but also share in the loss if
no money remains because of excessive referrals or hospital stays.192
Not only does this system discourage doctors from making referrals, it
encourages participating doctors to apply pressure on each other to keep
referrals to a minimum.
The second kind of incentive, "bonuses," are very similar to risk
pools, 193 except that money is not withheld from doctor's capitation pay-
ment. At the beginning of the accounting period, the HMO will place a
certain amount of money in a fund set aside for hospitalizations and
referrals.' 94 Any money left in the fund at the end of the accounting
period will be distributed to the participating physicians above and
beyond their regular capitation compensation.1 95
The third kind of incentive, "expanded capitation," is where the
doctor's capitated amount for each patient includes an amount for antici-
pated referrals and hospitalizations. 96 All tests, referrals and expenses
are included in the amount paid to the physician.' 97 If the doctor makes
a referral, it is paid by the physician out of the money the physician has
already received from the HMO. 198 This places all the risk of loss upon
the doctor and also provides an incentive to keep ancillary care to an
absolute minimum.
In addition to these incentives, some HMOs are imposing fines on
physicians for treatment they deem to be excessive.' 99 For example, one
doctor was fined $500 for each day his patient was hospitalized that the
HMO determined was unnecessary."
Yet another penalty for participating physicians who make too
many referrals is the looming threat of losing the physician's HMO
membership status. Physicians who have disregarded the bonus incen-
tives and made the referrals they deemed necessary, and in the process
exceeded the number of referrals allowed under the utilization manage-
190. See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians,
22 Am. J.L. & MED. 399, 404 (1996).
191. See id.
192. See William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Healthcare: History
and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INs. L.J. 451, 481 (1991).
193. See Thomas J. Maxwell, A View From a Doctor's Office, 13 Del. L. 33, 35 (1995).
194. See supra note 164, at 1828.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See 60 Minutes, supra note 29, at 14.
200. See id.
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ment projections, have been penalized by losing their HMO membership
entirely.2"' The threat of losing a large portion of a physician's practice
may be enough to keep participating physicians under the limit if they
are not motivated by the positive reinforcement of risk pools, bonuses
and capitation. The effect of these incentives and disincentives is that
HMO physicians are reluctant to make referrals to specialists, even
when necessary.
This scenario places the physician in an unenviable position-he
either places himself at risk of committing medical malpractice by miss-
ing a diagnosis, which may have been discovered by a specialist through
additional testing, or else he places himself at risk of losing his income
or even his practice by exceeding the HMO's utilization quota of allow-
able referrals. The physician may find himself not only unable to prac-
tice defensive medicine, but unable to even practice medicine within
acceptable medical standards.
F. Gag Clauses
HMOs have received extensive criticism for using a drastic ploy
known as a "gag clause" to prevent member physicians from criticizing
the HMO.2°2 Gag clauses are contractual provisions which, among other
things, prevent the physician, explicitly or implicitly, from disclosing
information to patients about treatment options that are not covered
under their health plan.20 3 Gag clauses are shocking because they hinder
open discussion between doctor and patient-an essential element of the
doctor-patient relationship.2" Additionally, some gag clauses prohibit
physicians from informing patients about limits on their coverage and
incentives. Unfortunately, doctors are being fired or blacklisted for dis-
closing such information.20 5 Some of the other restrictions of gag
clauses include prohibitions against disclosing the doctor's employment
arrangement with the HMO, soliciting non-HMO patients, and the doc-
tor's participation in any debates which criticize HMOs."°6
One interesting example of a gag clause states, "do not discuss pro-
posed treatments with [patients] prior to receiving authorization from the
plan. °20 7 Another example of a common gag clause is: "the physician
201. See Kish, supra note 161.
202. See Malinowski, supra note 37, at 350.
203. See AMA Takes Stand Against Health Plan "Gag" Rules, West's Legal News, July 10,
1996.
204. See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of "Gag
Clauses" in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 434 (1996).
205. See Erik Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44, 50.
206. See generally id.
207. See Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 204, at 444.
19981
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
agrees not to exert influence on members to switch their enrollment to
another form of healthcare coverage, or to involve members unnecessa-
rily in Plan administrative or procedural issues, but instead, agrees to
seek problem resolution through the Plan grievance procedures."2 8
Thus, it is clear that gag clauses limit communication between doctor
and patient, and undermine the patient's trust in his doctor. Moreover,
gag clauses seem to validate the growing criticism against HMOs.2 °9
Since gag clauses interfere with the well-established tort doctrine of
informed consent, 2 ° and may otherwise be unconscionable, many states
are enacting legislation to make such clauses illegal. So far, 16 states
have enacted legislation prohibiting gag clauses in physician contracts
with HMOs.2 1 Similarly, a new federal regulation of the Department of
Health & Human Services provides that any contract limiting a doctor's
ability to advise and counsel a Medicare patient violates Medicare
rules.212 Additionally, the U.S. House of Representatives recently
passed a Republican-sponsored health care bill which contained a provi-
sion that would eliminate gag clauses. Because of debates along tradi-
tional party lines, however, President Clinton is likely to veto the bill
unless bipartisan changes are incorporated, thus, federal measures are
likely to be stalled. 213 Fortunately for patients and also for doctors
(from a informed consent liability standpoint), these kinds of clauses
appear to be becoming a thing of the past.
V. ERISA PREEMPTION
HMOs have successfully isolated themselves from liability by
asserting Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) preemption. This defense has the effect of leaving doctors lia-
ble for medical malpractice claims which actually may have resulted
from decisions imposed by the HMO.214 For example, if the primary
care physician did not make a referral to a specialist for diagnostic tests
208. Barry M. Manuel, Physician Liability Under Managed Care, 183 J. Am. C. Surgeons 537,
539 (1996).
209. See Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Tilting at HMO'S, Cal. L., Feb. 1997, at 85.
210. See Schloendlorff v. Society New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (Judge
Cardozo wrote that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine
what shall be done with his own body..."); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing "requirement of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient").
211. See Grinfeld, supra note 209, at 85.
212. See id.
213. See HMO Reform Bill Passes House, MIAMI HERALD, July 17, 1998; see also House
Backs Republican Health Reform Bill, REUTERS NEWS, July 24, 1998.
214. See Frederick Schmitt, New York Legislation Aims to Increase HMO Liability, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER, Apr. 8, 1996, at 6 (quoting New York Senator Guy J. Velella, Republican - Bronx/
Westchester).
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because of an HMO decision or constraint, and that resulted in a failure
to diagnose which harmed the patient, in most cases the doctor, not the
HMO, could be sued for the malpractice because the HMO is often
shielded from liability under ERISA.
ERISA "provides a detailed system of civil enforcements which
limits who may file suit, the grounds for such suits, and the relief to
which a litigant is entitled." '215 Congress also added a preemption provi-
sion which dictates that ERISA shall supersede all state laws insofar as
they "relate to any employee benefit plan. '2 16  The phrase, "relate to"
has been the key question in many lawsuits challenging preemption, but
in principle, the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA's preemptive
provision as having a very broad reach.217
Despite the complex and confusing nature of the statute, some rules
of thumb have emerged. ERISA preemption can only occur where an
HMO has been provided through employment.218 HMO coverage
obtained independent of employment is simply not preempted by ERISA
at all. Also, ERISA does not apply to governmental employees or
church employees, 219 and ERISA preemption can only be applicable if
the plan is an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan. 2
There are two types of preemption under ERISA: "complete pre-
emption" under §502 (29 USC §1132), and "conflict preemption" under
§514 (29 USC § 1144).221 If a claim is found to be preempted under
either or both sections, the result will be dismissal of the state law
claim. 2 Complete preemption under §502 pertains to federal courts'
removal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule.2 3 Actions
that fall under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions of §502 are com-
pletely preempted. 4 Complete preemption occurs if one or more of the
claims are characterized as: (1) an effort to recover benefits under the
plan, (2) enforce rights under the plan, or (3) clarify rights to future
benefits under the plan. 25 If any of these three purposes are at the core
of plaintiffs claim, the state law claims are precluded 22 6 and the case
215. Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health Inc., 753 F.Supp. 61, 63 (D.Conn. 1990).
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
217. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129
(1992).
218. See Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, HMO Liability - Part III: ERISA Preemption,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 3.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. (citing Metopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 (1987)).
224. Id. at 107.
225. See id. (citing 24 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).
226. See id.
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may be removed by defendants to federal court where it is subject to
dismissal.
Conflict preemption (§514), on the other hand, has no jurisdictional
basis for removal, but does provide a defense which may result in dis-
missal of the state law claims." 7 Section 514 provides, with few excep-
tions, that there is complete preemption if the claim "relates to the
plan. 22 8
A. Split Decisions Regarding Complete Preemption (§ 502)
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have addressed vicarious
liability under §502 and have all held that ERISA does not preempt state
court claims under complete preemption. This is good news for plain-
tiffs and doctors, but bad news for HMOs. The circuits are split, how-
ever, on the issue of direct liability under §502.
1. SECOND CIRCUIT: VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND DIRECT LIABILITY NOT
PREEMPTED UNDER § 502
Complete preemption was addressed by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Lupo v. Human Affairs Intern., Inc.,229 a case sounding in
medical malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction
of emotional distress against a psychotherapy group. The court held
that there were insufficient grounds for removal to federal court under
§502 because the plaintiff's claims did not bear any significant resem-
blance to the type of claims covered under §502, i.e., claims to recover
benefits due under the plan, to enforce rights under the plan, or to clarify
rights to future benefits under the plan.23°
2. THIRD CIRCUIT: VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND DIRECT LIABILITY NOT
PREEMPTED UNDER § 502
The leading case on complete preemption was the subsequent case
of Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,23" ' wherein the court reversed rulings in
two cases where ERISA had been found to preempt the vicarious liabil-
ity of HMOs for the malpractice of their physicians.232 Both cases were
227. See id. (citing Jass v. Prudential Health Care plan, Inc. 88 F.3d 1482, 1485-87 (7th Cir.
1995)).
228. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. 88 F.3d 1482, 1485 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 153 (10th Cir. 1995); Corcoran v. United
Healthcare Inc. 965 F.2d 1321, 1328-29 (5th Cir. 1992).
229. 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994).
230. See id. at 272.
231. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995).
232. See Visconti v. U.S. Healthcare, 857 F.Supp. 1097 (ED Pa. 1994); see also Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare Systems of Pennsylvania Inc., 848 F.Supp. 39 (ED Pa. 1994).
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based upon ostensible agency and agency-in-fact, and also alleged direct
negligence in selecting, evaluating, employing, and overseeing the phy-
sicians who committed malpractice. 33 The court drew an important,
albeit confusing, distinction between quality of benefits received and the
quantity of benefits received: Claims based upon the quality of services
are not preempted whereas claims based upon quantity of service (denial
of benefits) are preempted. 234 The court reasoned that "a claim about
the quality of a benefit received is not a claim under §502(a)(1)(B) 'to
recover benefits due... under the terms of the plan." 2 35 The court did
not find any plan-created right inherent in plaintiffs' state law malprac-
tice claims and instead viewed plaintiffs' claims as "attempting to assert
their already existing rights under the generally-applicable state law of
agency and tort, ' 236 seeking to hold the HMO liable as arrangers of
plaintiffs' medical treatment.237 The court correctly observed that
"patients enjoy the right to be free from medical malpractice regardless
of whether or not their medical care is provided through an ERISA
plan,' '2 38 and also pointed out that nothing in the legislative history
structure or purpose of ERISA suggested that Congress viewed §502 as
creating a remedy for plan members injured by medical malpractice.239
Whereas the court was probably correct in its analysis of congres-
sional intent, their decision in Dukes creates an illogical incentive for
HMOs to avoid liability by denying care altogether rather than to pro-
vide care that could be deemed of substandard quality, since denying
care entirely would result in ERISA preemption under the Dukes opinion
but providing inferior care would not. Moreover, the distinction of qual-
ity versus quantity is murky, since denial of benefits (quantity) can also
amount to inferior quality care. Conversely, quality of care can be so
minimal as to constitute a denial of benefits. Courts will ultimately have
to devise a more reliable criteria than quality and quantity for determin-
ing what constitutes preemption under §502.
3. SEVENTH CIRCUIT: VICARIOUS LIABILITY NOT PREEMPTED; DIRECT
LIABILITY PREEMPTED UNDER § 502
In a subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit in Rice v. Panchal,240
decided that a plaintiff's claim seeking to hold an HMO liable under the
233. See Visconti, 857 F.Supp. at 1102; Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42.
234. See Dukes, 357 F.3d at 358.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 357.
240. See Rice v. Panchal 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995).
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respondeat superior doctrine for negligence of its physicians is not pre-
empted under §502, because the claim "does not rest upon the terms of
an ERISA plan, and it can be resolved without interpreting an ERISA
plan."24' The Rice court, however, did not rule on the issue of direct
negligence, but based its finding of no preemption upon the absence of a
direct negligence claim, which foreshadowed its subsequent ruling in
Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.242
In Jass, the Seventh Circuit deviated from the Second and Third
Circuits, by finding that claims of direct negligence against HMOs are
completely preempted under §502.243 Jass arose out of a nurse's deci-
sion to discharge a patient after knee surgery without rehabilitation. The
nurse, doctor, and HMO were all joined as defendants. The court held
that the claims were preempted, reasoning that the claims amounted to a
denial of benefits which could not be resolved without interpreting the
benefits contract. 244 The Seventh Circuit apparently rejected the Third
Circuit's reasoning that such claims are asserting "already existing rights
under the generally-applicable state law of agency and tort, 24 5 and do
not require examination of the plan to reach such determination.246
4. FIRST CIRCUIT: DIRECT NEGLIGENCE FOR DENIAL OF BENEFITS
PREEMPTED UNDER § 502
In the recent case of Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan,
Inc.,247 the court held that Plaintiffs state law claims of breach of con-
tract, wrongful death, and other state law claims, are preempted by
§502.248 The court further held that the Plaintiff's amended complaint
which contained a claim under ERISA that the HMO breached its fiduci-
ary duty by denying an experimental bone marrow transplant, was prop-
erly dismissed because the relief expressly provided under ERISA is to
secure benefits under the plan rather than to allow damages for breach of
the plan.249 Since ERISA provides only equitable relief, and equitable
relief is moot once the patient has died, no remedy is available under
ERISA.25 0 The court's holding in Turner conflicts with the Eighth Cir-
cuit's recent decision in Shea v. Esensten, where the court allowed a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, despite the availability
241. Id. at 646.
242. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir.1996).
243. See id. at 1488-90.
244. Id.
245. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358.
246. See id. at 350.
247. See Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997).
248. See id. at 199.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 198.
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of only equitable relief."5'
B. Split Decisions Regarding Conflict Preemption (§ 514)
As previously mentioned, §514 preempts claims that "relate to [an
ERISA] plan." Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed
ERISA preemption in the context of medical malpractice liability, it has
reviewed ERISA preemption in a general tort setting, pointing out that
ERISA is not intended to preempt "run-of-the-mill state law claims such
as . . .torts committed by an ERISA plan." '252
1. TENTH CIRCUIT: NO PREEMPTION FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY
UNDER § 514
It is with this in mind that the Tenth Circuit in Pacificare of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage,253 held that a medical malpractice claim
against the HMO for the negligence of its physician does not "relate to
the plan," and as such, is not preempted under §514.254 The court rea-
soned that ERISA does not preempt "laws of general application-not
specifically targeting ERISA plans-that involve traditional areas of
state regulation and do not affect relations among the principal ERISA
entities." '255 The court further reasoned that "As long as a state law does
not affect the structure, the administration, or the type of benefits pro-
vided by an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the [state law] has some
economic impact on the plan does not require that the [state law] be
invalidated." '256 Merely because a plan is potentially liable for judgment
"is not enough to relate the action to the plan." '257 The court concluded:
Just as ERISA does not preempt the malpractice claim against the
doctor, it should not preempt the vicarious liability claim against the
HMO if the HMO has held out the doctor as its agent .... We agree
with the district court that reference to the plan to resolve the agency
issue does not implicate the concerns of ERISA preemption." '258
2. SEVENTH CIRCUIT: VICARIOUS LIABILITY PREEMPTED UNDER § 514
The Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Jass v. Pru-
dential,259 holding that vicarious liability claims are preempted by §514
251. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997).
252. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, 468 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).
253. Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
254. See id. at 153.
255. Id. at 154.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 155.
258. Id.
259. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir.1996).
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because they are "related to the plan." 6' The court reasoned that the
relationship between the physician and the HMO would have to be
examined in order to determine whether vicarious liability existed,
which meant the claim related to the plan.26" ' The court tried to distin-
guish Jass from Pacificare by noting that Pacificare involved negligent
treatment, whereas Jass involved a failure to treat when the plan denied
coverage (the quality versus quantity approach again). This distinction
does not hold water from a vicarious liability standpoint, and these two
cases are clearly irreconcilable.
3. FIFTH CIRCUIT: DIRECT LIABILITY FOR DENIAL OF BENEFITS-
PREEMPTED UNDER § 514
As previously noted, claims pertaining to quantity of care (denial of
benefits) and claims where an HMO failed to approve treatment face
great difficulty in ERISA preemption. The Fifth Circuit held in Corco-
ran v. United Healthcare, Inc.2 62 that the wrongful death of a fetus aris-
ing from an HMO utilization reviewer's determination who denied
hospitalization was preempted under §514.263 The court reached this
conclusion since a determination of available benefits under the plan
would have to be made, which causes the action to be "related to the
plan. 2 64
4. NINTH CIRCUIT: DIRECT LIABILITY FOR DELAY OR DENIAL OF
BENEFITS-PREEMPTED UNDER § 514
Following the same line of reasoning as the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit held in Comer v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan2 65 that claims
against HMOs arising from delays or refusals to authorize treatment are
preempted by §514.266 Here too the court held that the plan must be
reviewed in order to determine appropriateness of the delay and covered
treatment, and as such, the claims were deemed "related to the Plan. '2 67
Other courts have found that delays in treatment are a matter of negli-
gence, not a denial of benefits and are not subject to preemption.268
260. See id. at 1490-91.
261. See id. at 1491.
262. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
263. See id. at 1331.
264. See id. at 1332.
265. See Comer v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 45 F.3d 435 (9th Cir. 1992).
266. See id.
267. See id.
268. See Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 716 (Pa. 1996); see also Michael A. Riccardi, Med-
Mal Suit Against HMO Not Barred By ERISA, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 21, 1996, at 1
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Pappas).
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5. EIGHTH CIRCUIT: DIRECT LIABILITY FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE
INCENTIVES OR CANCELING SURGERY-PREEMPTED UNDER
§ 514; CLAIMS OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
VALID UNDER ERISA § 1104(A)(1)
In a case of first impression, Shea v. Esensten,269 the Eighth Circuit
followed the other circuits by holding that state tort claims against an
HMO for failure to disclose the fact that it provided incentives designed
to deter its participating physicians from making referrals, were pre-
empted under §514.270 The court added a new wrinkle to the ERISA
morass, however, by holding that the Plaintiffs claim of breach of fidu-
ciary duty for failing to disclose the financial incentives was valid and
could be brought under ERISA. The court pointed out that ERISA
requires plan fiduciaries to "discharge [their] duties with respect to a
plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."27' Addi-
tionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that ERISA fiduciaries
must comply with the common law duty of loyalty, which includes the
obligation to deal fairly and honestly with all plan members.272 The
court in Shea reasoned that patients "[rely] on doctor's advice about
treatment options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influ-
enced by self-serving financial considerations created by the health
insurance provider. '273 The court further pointed out that "Health care
decisions involve matters of life and death, and an ERISA fiduciary has
a duty to speak out if it 'knows that silence might be harmful. ' '2 74 The
court laid down the rule that "[w]hen an HMO's financial incentives
discourage a treating doctor from providing essential health care refer-
rals for conditions covered under the plan benefit structure, the incen-
tives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of ERISA's
fiduciary duties. 275
In a previous case, the Eighth Circuit held that §514 preempted a
claim against an HMO for actually canceling a scheduled surgery after
its precertification review. 6 The court reasoned that precertification
was directly related to administration of benefits under the plan.2 77 The
court indicated, however, that if an HMO had a more direct involvement
269. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
270. See id. at 627.
271. Id. at 628; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(1994).
272. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1074-75 (1996).
273. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
274. See id. at 629 (quoting Bixler v. Central Penn. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d
1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993)).
275. Shea, 107 F.3d at 628.
276. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat. Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993).
277. See id.
19981
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
in canceling the surgery other than refusing to pay for it, there might be
liability.278
C. Synopsis of ERISA Decisions
Since the holding in Dukes, there appears to be a trend for federal
courts to remand cases back to state courts.2 7 9 Once theses cases are
remanded, the state courts are less likely to find ERISA preemption.28°
It appears that the more claims look like medical malpractice/negligence
cases, the better chance they stand of avoiding ERISA preemption.
Cases that assert state law claims based upon the quality of health care
provided may be beyond ERISA's preemptive scope. Cases that focus
on quantity of benefits or denial of benefits are usually preempted. The
majority rule is that ERISA does not preempt vicarious liability claims
against HMOs, because they merely relate to the quality of benefits
received and not to the plan itself.28' On the other hand, claims based
upon direct liability such as cost containment schemes or corporate neg-
ligence relate to the administration of the plan and are therefore pre-
empted. Claims such as breach of fiduciary duty have been held to be
encompassed under ERISA and may be pursued in federal court,282
however, the only available remedy thereunder is equitable relief.283
Plaintiff's will be more likely to succeed by characterizing their
claims as being related to the quality of the care provided and asserting
that the inferior care provided by the HMO was a deviation from accept-
able standards. HMOs are more likely to succeed by characterizing the
claims as denial-of-benefits claims within the scope of §502 (a), or as
being otherwise "related to the plan" under §514(a).
HMOs best line of defense, however, may be measures that can be
taken in advance of any litigation. One such measure might be to
replace the state law standard of care with a higher (or lower) standard
of care adopted by contract under the health plan. This would enable
attorneys for the HMO to later argue that a plaintiff's quality-of-care
claim is really a denial-of-benefits claim and therefore, subject to pre-
emption.284 Additionally, HMOs can reduce the likelihood of successful
278. See id.
279. See James Walker Smith & Christopher P. Hannon, Focus of Managed Care: ERISA
Preemption: No Longer a "Sure Thing' for HMOs, 14 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW & STRATEGY
1, 3 (1997).
280. See id.
281. See generally Panah, supra note 13 (noting ERISA preemption cases at both the federal
trial court and appeals levels).
282. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
283. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
284. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 359.
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vicarious liability claims by ensuring that plan administrators, particu-
larly physicians or nurses, serve only in an administrative capacity. A
successful tack for HMOs is that they are not practicing medicine, but
are merely designating what they will and will not pay. The patient is
still at liberty to seek other treatment and pay for it on their own. Per-
haps the best news for plaintiffs and doctors is that many states are
enacting legislation specifically allowing HMOs to be sued for medical
malpractice. This legislation might indirectly be good news for HMOs
who can then gauge their liability more accurately, adjust covered serv-
ices, adjust premiums, and generally take steps to implement systems
that avoid pitfalls that lead to medical malpractice.
VI. CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE DOCTRINE
In addition to the ERISA preemption, defendant HMOs utilize the
legal doctrine known as the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine as
a defense. This doctrine is closely entwined with the issue of what con-
stitutes "practicing medicine," and both must be analyzed together.
Laws that specifically govern the practice of medicine vary from state to
state, but almost all of the states have adopted some form of the Corpo-
rate Practice of Medicine Doctrine.285 Some state legislatures have lim-
ited the scope of the doctrine specifically providing that corporations
(and HMOs) are not deemed to be practicing medicine.286 Variations of
this theme appear in the statutes of several states including South
Dakota, North Dakota, California, New Jersey, and New York. 87
The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine's underlying premise
is essentially that a corporation (such as a hospital or an HMO) cannot
be licensed to practice medicine and thus cannot command or forbid any
act by a doctor in the practice of medicine. The corporation's relation-
ship with the doctor it employs is necessarily that of an independent
contractor. Hence, an entity employing a doctor cannot be held liable
for a doctor's negligence based on respondeat superior.288 The doctrine
was initially conceived to preserve the independence of physicians from
corporate influence.
It is ironic and somewhat perverse that this doctrine has been con-
torted to be used as a defense by HMOs, when the doctrine's purpose
was to protect the public from the commercial exploitation of medicine
285. See State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429 (Ca. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
286. See Smith, supra note 153, at 2 (States that provide that HMOs, by definition, are not
medical practitioners, are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Tennessee).
287. See Holden v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 678 N.E. 2d 342, 346-48 (I11. App. 2d 1997).
288. See Moon v. Mercy Hospital, 373 P.2d 944 (Colo. 1962).
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by entities like HMOs. 89 The rationale for the doctrine is that "[it is]
against public policy to permit a middleman to intervene for profit in
establishing the professional relationship between members of the medi-
cal profession and members of the public."29  The gist of HMO coun-
sels' twisted (albeit creative) use of this doctrine as a defense has been
that since the doctrine establishes corporations are incapable of practic-
ing medicine, they cannot be held liable for medical malpractice.2 91
Courts have widely accepted this argument,292 despite its ridiculous
rationale. This argument is essentially no different than saying, "but
officer, I am incapable of speeding because speeding is against the law!"
The slight of hand is apparently in use of the word "incapable," instead
of "prohibited." When the word "prohibited" is substituted, it becomes
more apparent that the argument is a non-sequitur. Simply because
something is prohibited does not mean that the prohibition has not been
violated and that liability should not attach. If facts of a particular case
show that a corporation has undertaken activities that amount to practic-
ing medicine, courts should hold that the corporation violated the doc-
trine, not that they are cleansed of liability by it.2 93
Along these lines, at least one court has recognized that as a matter
of public policy, society is not prepared to abandon the rule against the
Corporate Practice of Medicine,2 94 and held that the corporation in that
case was illegally engaged in the practice of medicine. 295  The U.S.
Supreme Court has also held that the power to regulate the practice of
medicine is within each state's police power, 296 and that the police
power of the state includes the power to enact comprehensive, detailed,
and rigid regulations of the practice of medicine, surgery, and
dentistry.297
289. See Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (N.J. 1995) (quoting Michael A. Dowell, The
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine Must Go, HEALTHSPAN, Nov. 1994, at 7).
290. See id.
291. See Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. App. 1987).
292. See id.; see also Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 384 F.Supp. 434
(W.D.Tex. 1974); Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 358 F.Supp. 1016
(W.D.Tex. 1973); California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 155 P.2d 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
1945); Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799 (I11. 1935); Holden v. Rockford
Memorial Hosp., 678 N.E. 2d 342, 354 (II1. App. 2d 1997); Propst v. Health Maintenance Plan,
Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio App. 1990).
293. See Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 358 F.Supp 1016, 1018-19 (W.D.
Tex. 1973) (noting that "when a corporation employs a licensed physician to treat patients and
itself receives the fee, the corporation is unlawfully engaged in the practice of medicine and the
licensed physician so employed is violating the provisions of Article 4505 (12)").
294. See State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 82 P.2d 429 (Ca. 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
295. See id.
296. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 603 (1926).
297. See Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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As the Court pointed out in Garcia v. Texas State Board of Medical
Examiners,298 "Nothing is more fundamental than the rights of the vari-
ous states to furnish the people competent health services,299 and as a
direct corollary to this right they have a corresponding duty to carefully
prescribe minimum requirements for the licensing of those administering
medical and surgical services."3 ° The Court went on to say that since
medicine is a highly specialized field of experts who deal with the very
lives of the citizenry, the states must insure, to the best of their ability,
the competency of these experts.30 '
Physician licensure statutes were initially enacted to protect the
populace from the early medical quacks and charlatans who abused the
unwary public as entrepreneurial medicine men selling snake oil reme-
dies.3"2 Eventually, public outrage over harmful medicines and
untrained "healers" became so widespread, that federal and state govern-
ments began to act. Rigid licensing requirements were adopted by all
states.303
An example of a typical state law governing the practice of
medicine is the Texas Medical Practice Act,304 which states in pertinent
part: that a person shall be considered to be "practicing medicine" within
the act:
(A) who shall publicly profess to be a physician or surgeon and shall
diagnose, treat, or offer to treat any disease or disorder, mental or
physical, or any physical deformity or injury by any system or
method or to effect cures thereof; or
(B) who shall diagnose, treat, or offer to treat any disease or disor-
der, mental or physical, or any physical deformity or injury by any
system or method or to effect cures thereof and charge therefor,
directly or indirectly, money or other compensation.30 5
Additionally, article 20A.29 of the Texas Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act states that the Act shall not be construed to:
(a) authorize any person, other than a duly licensed physician or
practitioner of the healing arts, acting within the scope of his or her
license, to engage, directly or indirectly, in the practice of medicine
or any healing art, or
(b) authorize any person to regulate, interfere, or intervene in any
manner in the practice of medicine or any healing art.
298. Garcia, 358 F.Supp. at 1019.
299. See 358 F.Supp. at 1019.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. § 1.03(12) (West 1998).
305. Id.
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Citing these provisions of the statute, The Court of Appeals of Texas,
nevertheless held in Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc.306 that the
defendant doctors could not have been employees of the defendant
HMO since that would violate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doc-
trine's prohibition. 3 7 The court did point out, however, that the record
showed that at no time did any person, agent, or employee of the HMO
have any right to direct and or control the work or practice of medicine
by the defendant doctors, leaving open the possibility that if such direc-
tion or control were present, liability might attach to the HMO.
Similarly, in Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine,3 "8
the court overturned the District of Columbia Board of Medicine's find-
ing that a doctor who was not licensed in the District of Columbia and
acting as Medical Director of Health Affairs for Blue Cross was practic-
ing medicine without a license. The court determined that the doctor
was acting in a purely administrative capacity and was not involved in
the "pre-treatment decision making process. 3 °9 Interestingly, the doctor
himself acknowledged that if he had had a voice in the recommendations
of the medical advisers and review committees, then he would have been
practicing medicine. 310 This rationale suggests that the court would
have held differently if the doctor had been involved in making or influ-
encing medical decisions in advance of treatment. In fact, the court left
open the possibility "that on other facts a medical administrator of a
health insurer such as Blue Cross which monitors and regularly ques-
tions treatment decisions by physicians, may not be found to have prac-
ticed medicine as defined as defined in §2-3301.2(7)' ' 311 "The focus
must be on the actions of the individual administrator .. . 32 The
court pointed out that if the doctor had been found to be practicing
medicine without a license, he would also have been subject to criminal
punishment.31 3
The court in Morris acknowledged dicta in its previous decision in
Joseph v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 314 that "members of
the Board of Medicine are presumed to have substantially greater famili-
arity than do judges with the meaning of terms like 'practice of
medicine,' so that if a decision of the Board rests upon its interpretation
306. See Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc.- Healthamerica Corporation of Texas, 743
S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
307. See id. at 377.
308. See Morris v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 701 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1997).
309. See id. at 366.
310. See id. at 367.
311. See id. at 368.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See Joseph v. District of Columbia Board of Medicine, 587 A.2d 1085, 1088 (D.C. 1991).
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of the statute, we must give the Board's decision substantial weight."3 5
Interestingly, in Joseph, the court affirmed the Board's determination
that an expert witness who testified falsely in a medical malpractice case
had made a "diagnosis" within the meaning of the statute, in that he
conducted an investigation and analysis of the nature of the plaintiff's
condition and cause of death.316 This reasoning could arguably be
extended to HMO personnel who conduct an investigation and analysis
of a patient's condition prior to denying benefits.
In distinguishing between merely administering a health organiza-
tion and practicing medicine, control over how services are provided to
patients seems to be a determinative factor.3 17 All health care providers
must perform business, administrative, and management chores, but as
long as these functions do not "impinge upon professional control by the
physicians of the medical practice," the corporation is not deemed to be
practicing medicine. 318 The main issue in allowing HMOs to "employ"
physicians becomes whether the relationship between a doctor and the
patient becomes "so destroyed as to allow the [employer] to become the
medical practitioner. 3
19
To further aid in determining whether a corporation has engaged in
acts that constitute the practice of medicine, it is helpful to look at the
criteria established by the Illinois supreme court in the case of Dr.
Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison.31 ° The court in Allison stated that
merely "operating" a dental clinic office by employing a dentist to per-
form certain services for the patients and customers constituted practic-
ing medicine. 32' The supreme court substantiated this definition in
People v. United Medical Services, where it found that a corporation's
contracting for the payment for medical services qualified as practicing
medicine. 32 Although Allison was decided in 1936, it has not been
overturned. As such, there would appear to be a relatively low threshold
for what constitutes "practicing medicine" in Illinois. In general, there
may be a willingness of courts to find that corporations are practicing
medicine absent specific statutes precluding it, if the corporation has
exerted control over the patient care and injected itself into the doctor/
patient relationship. If an HMO is making determinations as to what
315. See Morris, 701 A.2d at 367.
316. See Joseph, 587 A.2d at 1089.
317. See Daw's Critical Care Registry, Inc. v. Department of Labor, Employment Security
Division, 622 A.2d 622,636 (1992), aff'd 622 A.2d 518 (Conn. 1993).
318. See Women's Medical Center v. Finley, 469 A.2d 65, 73 (1983), cert. denied, 475 A.2d
578 (1984).
319. See St. Francis Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Weiss, 869 P.2d 606, 615 (1994).
320. See Dr. Allison, Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 196 N.E. 799, 800 (1935).
321. See id.
322. See People v. United Medical Service, 200 N.E. 157, 163 (I11. 1936).
19981
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
procedures and referrals it deems medically necessary or unnecessary, it
may in fact, be engaging in the corporate practice of medicine. There is
evidence that courts are beginning to recognize that coverage decisions
are increasingly likely to have direct clinical consequences.323
HMOs may claim that they are not practicing medicine but are
merely acting as an insurer, electing to undertake certain risks and not
others. But when the totality of the picture removes choices from the
patient and the doctor and casts the HMO in the role of the decision
maker, the pendulum could begin to swing against the HMOs.
VII. LEGISLATION
Whereas state legislatures around the country have spent the last
several years attempting to cap malpractice liability and reform insur-
ance, many of them may now expand liability of HMOs. 324 Addition-
ally, the U.S. House of Representatives has recently passed legislation
which could have a profound effect upon the liability of HMOs,
although President Clinton has indicated his intent to veto the bill.325
This section will briefly review the various states' approaches to reme-
dial legislation as well as the U.S. Congress' proposed bill:
A. State Legislation
1. TEXAS
Texas is taking the lead in proposing legislation designed to
increase the liability of HMOs.32 6 The Texas bills would make HMOs
responsible for negligent decisions when denial of medically necessary
medical treatment results in patient injury.327 Additionally, the proposed
bills would require HMOs to include a "reasonable lay-person" standard
in defining emergency care so that such a person could admit himself
into an emergency room without prior approval by the HMO. 3 8 Also of
significance is the prohibition of gag clauses in the proposed legisla-
tion.329 The measures are supported by the Texas Medical Association.
As its president, Dr. Hugh Lamensdorf, said, "We are not opposed to
323. See William M. Sage, James M. Jorling, A World That Won't Stand Still: Enterprise
Liability by Private Contract, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007, 1018 (1994).
324. See Special Report Afoot in Legislatures Would Make HMOs Liable, WASHINGTON
HEALTH WEEK, Apr. 14, 1997.
325. See House Backs Republican Health Reform Bill, supra note 213.
326. See generally Schlegel, supra note 119; see, e.g., HMO Liability Bill Sent To Bush's
Desk, supra note 21.
327. See Schlegel, supra note 119.
328. See id.
329. See id.
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managed care; we are opposed to mismanagement of care."33 The
response by an HMO spokesman was the rhetorical inquiry, ".... [a]re
we [HMOs] going to be held accountable for medical malpractice when
we don't practice medicine?"33 Despite the widespread support for the
proposed legislation, Texas Governor George Bush seems reluctant to
sign the bill, expressing concern that it would create new avenues for
filing lawsuits. 332 Eighteen months prior to this proposed legislation,
Bush vetoed the "Patient Protection Act," because he felt it imposed too
many rules which would have increased health care costs.
333
2. NEW YORK
New York is also considering a bill designed to hold HMOs liable
for negligence related to medical decision making. Under the proposed
bill, HMOs would be liable for the consequences of their decisions
regarding the provision or denial of health care.334 The bill requires that
health care organizations "use reasonable care when making decisions
that affect the diagnosis, care or treatment of an enrollee, and also to
exercise reasonable care in selecting and exerting influence or control
over employees and other representatives acting on their behalf with
regard to decisions that affect the quality of a subscriber's diagnosis,
care or treatment. ' 335 The Medical Society of the State of New York as
well as the New York State Trial Lawyers Association support the bill,
indicating the need to hold HMOs and insurers legally responsible when
their decisions cause injury or death to a patient.336 This law would also
serve to displace current New York law337 which provides that provision
of health services by HMOs, either directly or indirectly, is not to be
considered the practice of medicine by the HMO.338
3. CALIFORNIA
California legislators have proposed nearly 50 bills, approximately
30 of which have already passed the Senate with broad bi-partisan sup-
port. 339 The bills address a wide range of criticisms about health plans,
focusing mostly on complaints about HMOs "cutting costs at the
330. See id.
331. Id.
332. See Special Report Afoot in Legislatures Would Make HMOs Liable, supra note 324, at 3.
333. See Sanchez, supra note 149, at 19.
334. See generally Ryan, supra note 7; see also Schmitt, supra note 214, at 6.
335. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 5.
336. See id.
337. New York Public Health Law § 4410.
338. Id.
339. See California: Legislature Considers Numerous HMO Reform Bills, FIRST MED &
HEALTH NEWS, June 18, 1997, at 1.
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expense of patient well-being" 34° One provision would require that the
only person who can deny coverage in an HMO would be a licensed
California physician.34' Other provisions include a public disclosure as
to why treatment was refused, as well as an in-house physical exam of a
patient before treatment can be denied. 34" Although California Gover-
nor, Pete Wilson, has said that he recognizes the need for "beefed-up
regulation of managed care," he nevertheless appears reluctant to
endorse wholesale changes bowing to pressure from powerful HMOs.3 43
In a classic case of "the pot calling the kettle black," Dr. Albert Martin,
the medical Director of Blue Cross of California said, "by [the Califor-
nia Legislature] advancing so many control bills, the Legislature is prac-
ticing medicine and getting away with it because of so much publicity
and so many anecdotal horror stories." 34
4. GEORGIA
Georgia has passed several bills designed to control HMO prac-
tices. One such bill is known as the "Patient Protection Act," which
requires two-day hospital stays for normal deliveries and up to four days
for Caesarean deliveries.345 Another bill is called "The Prudent Lay-
person Bill," and is designed to expand the definition of necessary emer-
gency room coverage and prohibiting prospective approval of emer-
gency patients.346 Additional bills require HMOs to disclose treatment
options to the patient; provide an expanded appeal process; and bar
HMOs from providing financial incentives to doctors to deny needed
care.
347
5. NEW JERSEY
New Jersey has recently passed "Drive-by-Delivery or "Forty-
Eight Hour" rules, which protect new mothers from premature discharge
after delivery.3 48 The laws also prevent HMOs from terminating doctors
who advocate expensive procedures; and require that HMOs disclose
financial incentives; and limit denial of medical treatment only to a phy-
sician. 349 New Jersey is also considering the Health Care Provider
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. See Malone & Thaler, supra note 2.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
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Accountability Act of 1998, A.B. 1606.35 o This Act holds insurance
companies and HMOs liable for damages for harm caused by the failure
to exercise ordinary care in making health care treatment decisions.
3 5
'
6. OTHER STATES
Many other states are also considering legislation designed to regu-
late HMOs. Hawaii's bill recently passed the Senate and is pending in
the State House. 2 Washington and Hew Hampshire are also passing
far-reaching managed care legislation. 3  Missouri is presently consid-
ering a broad managed care bill in its House of Representatives. 354 Last
year, the Florida Legislature easily passed HMO liability legislation, but
it was vetoed by Governor Lawton Chiles.355 The Legislature did not
give up, however, and pushed through HMO legislation that provides the
prevailing party in any suit brought to enforce an HMO contract is enti-
tled to attorney's fees.356 A similar bill in Maryland, however, died in
legislative session. 7  Maryland is considering removing referral
requirements for dermatological treatment. 8 Colorado's proposed law
would diminish the discretion of HMOs regarding coverage decisions.359
Connecticut's proposed bill would create a statutory cause of action for
medical malpractice against HMOs.36° Illinois is considering legislation
that would restrict the discretion of HMOs in coverage decisions, would
require HMOs to be regulated by state insurance or public health depart-
ment, and would also prevent gag clauses that interfere with the Doctor-
patient communication.36' Indiana is considering diminishing the role of
HMOs in the decision making process, and will require coverage on all
FDA-approved drugs and devices.362 Pennsylvania and Vermont are
considering bills aimed at eliminating financial incentives for physicians
to limit medical care.363 Last, and perhaps least, Virginia has limited its
action to establishing a subcommittee to study the control of pharmacy
benefits by HMOs. 36  Despite the importance of these state laws, they
350. See Smith, supra note 153, at 2.
351. See id.
352. See Special Report Afoot in Legislatures Would Make HMOs Liable, supra note 324, at 1.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See FLA. STAT. § 641.28 (1997).
357. See Special Report Afoot in Legislatures Would Make HMOs Liable, supra note 324, at 2.
358. See Smith, supra note 153, at 3.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
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may become obsolete if federal legislation is signed into law.
B. Federal Legislation
Despite the proposed state legislation and recent court holdings,
there are still lingering questions as to whether causes of action will be
effective, absent meaningful change in ERISA.365 With this in mind,
bills have been introduced by both Democrats and Republicans in the
U.S. Congress. A democrat-sponsored bill designed to amend ERISA
was narrowly voted down (216-210). This bill would have permitted a
cause of action for denial of benefits under a managed care plan due to
negligent medical decisions or decisions resulting from cost-contain-
ment measures. 366 This bill was defeated in favor of the GOP bill,
which provides internal and external appeals processes as a remedy
against HMOs.36 7 One of the primary differences in the two plans is
that the Democrat's plan would expand a patient's ability to sue a health
plan, whereas the republican's plan relies on an expanded grievance and
appeals process. If a patient disagrees with a health plan's decision, the
patient can appeal internally, and then go to an independent external
medical reviewer for an additional binding opinion on any medical ser-
vice that costs more than $1,000.00.368 The bill contains several provi-
sions strongly opposed by the White House including a limit on the
amount that victims of medical malpractice can be awarded in
lawsuits.369
Insurance companies are strongly opposed to any kind of govern-
ment intervention, 370 and opponents of the bill claim it would result in
huge legal costs and raise the cost of health care.3 7' Conversely, a sur-
vey sponsored by a group called Patient Access to Responsible Care
Alliance ("PARCA") indicates that 85 percent of adults surveyed
favored laws ensuring HMOs are held legally accountable when their
decisions to delay or deny treatment results in illness, injury or death.372
The Democrats' proposed bill included a Patients' Bill of Rights
which Clinton backed and continues to push via his veto leverage.
These rights include consumers' rights to:
365. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 7.
366. See id.
367. See Health Care Fight Heats Up On Capital Hill, REUTERS NEWS, July 16, 1998.
368. See id.
369. See HMO Reform Bill Passes House, supra note 213.
370. See Health Care Fight Heats Up On Capital Hill, supra note 367.
371. See id.
372. See Health Care - Managed Care: Debtate on Managed Care Liability Bill Splits
Witnesses Along Traditional Lines, 66 U.S.L.W. 2281.
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" Receive accurately disclosed information;
* Choose health care providers;
* Have access to emergency care when and where the need arises;
" Participate fully in all decisions related to treatment;
* Receive considerate and respectful care;
* Communicate confidentially with health care providers;
" Have a fair and efficient process for resolving differences with
health plans, providers and institutions.
The bill also calls for an independent external appeals process.
This process would be available in cases where patients are denied pay-
ment or treatment based on "medical necessity" or "experimental treat-
ment" grounds, and all internal avenues have been exhausted.373 The
overwhelming public support for this pending legislation, combined
with the wave of public sentiment against HMOs and increasing public-
ity of HMO horror stories, makes it appear that the current state of
affairs with regard to HMOs is about to face dramatic change. Whether
change will be in the form of a Republican-backed grievance and
appeals process, a Democrat-backed right to sue HMOs, or a stalemate
resulting in a temporary status quo and unknown future proposals, attor-
neys for both plaintiffs and healthcare providers will be required to have
a thorough understanding of the HMO litigation minefield. They must
also have an eye toward the changing role of the doctor and the bioethi-
cal aspects of healthcare in general.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Are HMOs practicing medicine without a licence? In practice, the
answer is: of course they are. From a legal standpoint, it is less clear.
The law in many states does not view HMOs as engaging in the un-
licensed practice of medicine-even if HMOs are doing the exact same
things for which individuals have been convicted under state laws gov-
erning the unauthorized practice of medicine. Although some state stat-
utes say that HMOs are not practicing medicine, and some courts have
applied the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine which says that
they cannot practice medicine, more and more legislatures and courts are
beginning to reason that if it walks like a doctor, quacks like a doctor,
makes medical decisions and directs the course of patient care, then it is
probably practicing medicine, which should only be done by a doctor.
Health care reform, tort reform, and regulation of HMOs are areas
of the law that are still developing. Society needs to strike a balance
373. See Health Care - Managed Care: Presidential Commission Expected to Adopt Broad
Consumer Bill of Rights, U.S.L.W., Nov. 11, 1997, at 2282.
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between providing quality, affordable health care for its members, while
preserving the rights of plaintiffs to be compensated for harm caused by
malpractice, yet also discouraging unnecessary litigation. Medical deci-
sions should be made on the basis of scientific evaluation of an individ-
ual patient by that patient's doctor, free from any economic coercion
from HMOs, and free from the threat of unwarranted lawsuits.
With the current swell of public sentiment against HMOs coupled
with non-medical personnel making medical decisions based upon eco-
nomic criteria leading to huge HMO profits, HMOs may be vulnerable
to a backlash reaction. The potential exists for a tremendous explosion
of liability against HMOs for malpractice committed as a result of their
policies. This, in turn, will have disastrous effects on the affordability of
health care. HMOs will have to carefully evaluate their role in the noble
practice of medicine, and restructure their approach so they do not inter-
fere with the oath each doctor takes, to "use treatment to help the sick
according to my ability and judgment, but never with a view to injury
and wrongdoing. 374 Doctors must be allowed enough discretion and
freedom from financial considerations to treat their patients with a qual-
ity of care that HMO executives would approve for themselves and their
own families, 375 without cost as the primary concern.
In the final analysis, HMOs cannot be faulted for wanting to make
profits. The desire to make a profit has been one of the greatest
motivators in our society since the beginning of time, and has led to the
growth and development of our culture. But, nothing exceeds like
excess. As Lao-tzu wrote in approximately 531 B.C., "There is no
calamity greater than lavish desires; There is no greater guilt than dis-
contentment; And there is no greater disaster than greed. 3 76 Whether
society's current health care problems are caused by the "greed" of ter-
minal patients insisting on futile treatment, the greed of lawyers clamor-
ing for the huge verdict, the greed of doctors building the lucrative
practice, or the greed of insurers maximizing profits while minimizing
benefits, undoubtedly, greed is to blame. Overcoming this element of
human nature and striking the proper balance between a healthy popu-
lace, a healthy legal system, and healthy profits will be our challenge.
TOM J. MANOS
374. BARTLETT', supra note 26, at 88.
375. See Malinowski, surpa note 37, at 351.
376. See BARTLETT, supra note 26, at 74.
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